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Abstract—In network link prediction, it is possible to hide a target link from being predicted with a small perturbation on network
structure. This observation may be exploited in many real world scenarios, for example, to preserve privacy, or to exploit financial
security. There have been many recent studies to generate adversarial examples to mislead deep learning models on graph data.
However, none of the previous work has considered the dynamic nature of real-world systems. In this work, we present the first study
of adversarial attack on dynamic network link prediction (DNLP). The proposed attack method, namely time-aware gradient attack
(TGA), utilizes the gradient information generated by deep dynamic network embedding (DDNE) across different snapshots to rewire a
few links, so as to make DDNE fail to predict target links. We implement TGA in two ways: one is based on traversal search, namely
TGA-Tra; and the other is simplified with greedy search for efficiency, namely TGA-Gre. We conduct comprehensive experiments which
show the outstanding performance of TGA in attacking DNLP algorithms.
Index Terms—Link prediction, dynamic network, adversarial attack, network embedding
F
1 INTRODUCTION
In the era of big data, network analysis emerges as a powerfultool in various areas, such as recommendation on e-commerce
websites [1], bug detection in software engineering [2], and be-
havioral analysis in sociology [3]. In particular, dynamic networks
are attracting more attention recently due to their ability to model
evolving complex systems. Studies on such networks mainly focus
on the dynamic nature, i.e., time-varying links, which are known as
dynamic network link prediction (DNLP). DNLP algorithms aim
to predict the structure of networks in the near future based on his-
torical information. Different from static network link prediction
methods that typically depend on similarity indices (e.g., Common
Neighbor and Resource Allocation [4]), most DNLP algorithms
are achieved through machine learning, especially deep learning
based approach. For example, autoregressive integrated moving
average (ARIMA) and recurrent neural network (RNN) based deep
learning model that are popular in time-series data analysis, have
shown to be effective in DNLP.
Regardless of their performance, DNLP algorithms may suffer
from adversarial attacks as most machine learning methods do.
The exploitation of adversarial examples may expose DNLP algo-
rithms to security threats. However, from another perspective, this
property could be useful in other fields like privacy-preserving.
A well designed adversarial example may protect intimate rela-
tionships from being predicted by even the most advanced DNLP
approach. The target link could be hidden by linking the user
to someone unfamiliar, or removing intimate links in historical
interactions.
In this paper, we propose a novel adversarial attack targeting
DNLP, which we refer as Time-aware Gradient Attack (TGA),
to hide target links from being predicted. Benefited from the
gradients generated by deep learning model, i.e., DDNE, TGA
is able to find candidate links to be modified without extensive
search, and perform attack at minimum cost. Considering the
dynamics of networks, TGA compares the gradients on different
snapshots separately rather than does simple sorting on all snap-
shots; furthermore, it searches candidate links across iterations to
make full use of the gradients. The designed adversarial examples
could degrade not only DDNE, but also other DNLP algorithms,
validating the strong transferability of TGA. Overall, our main
contributions are summarized as follows.
• We design TGA to generate adversarial examples based
on the gradients obtained by DDNE. As far as we know, it
is the first work about adversarial attacks on DNLP.
• We conduct extensive experiments on three real-world dy-
namic networks and compare TGA with several baselines.
The results show that TGA achieves the state-of-the-art
attack performance.
• We further apply the generated adversarial examples to
other DNLP algorithms, such as ctRBM, GTRBM and
TNE, and their effectiveness on these algorithms validates
the strong transferability of TGA.
• We vary DNLP model parameters and observe several
interesting phenomena which could be inspiring to future
research. For example, long-term prediction is more vul-
nerable to adversarial attacks; while integrating more his-
torical information can increase the robustness of DDNE.
For the rest of this paper, we first review related work in Section 2
and preliminaries in Section 3. Section 4 presents the proposed
attack details, which are evaluated in Section 5.
2 RELATED WORK
This section briefly reviews the literature of DNLP algorithms and
the related work on adversarial attacks.
DNLP. Recently, a temporal restricted Boltzmann machine
(TRBM) was adopted with additional neighborhood information,
namely ctRBM [5], to learn the dynamics as well as the struc-
tural characteristics of networks. As an extension of ctRBM,
GTRBM [6] combines TRBM and boosting decision tree to
model the evolving pattern of each node. Besides the RBM-
based methods, recurrent neural networks (RNN), like long short-
term memory (LSTM), plays an important role in other DNLP
algorithms. A stacked LSTM module was applied inside the
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2autoencoder framework to capture time dependencies of the whole
network [7], and a gated recurrent network (GRU) was used
as the encoder which could relatively lower the computational
complexity [6]. There are also many other methods based on
random walk [8], matrix factorization [9] and so forth [10].
Adversarial attack. A bunch of works have explored the
field of adversarial attack on graph data. Community membership
anonymization was realized by connecting the target user to the
one of high centrality [11]. Another method focused on discon-
necting certain neighbors while adding links between different
communities, with regards to the centrality of degree, closeness
and betweenness [12]. In fact, community deception can be
achieved by only rewiring the links inner the target community [3].
On the other hand, the emerging network embedding techniques,
such as the graph convolutional network (GCN) [13], have drawn
wide attention these days. And NETTACK was proposed to gen-
erate adversarial examples with respect to graph structure and
node feature to fool the GCN model [14]. Another gradient-
based method called fast gradient attack (FGA) makes full use
of the gradients information to choose candidate links that need
modification when performing attack [15]. Not limited to the
manipulation on links, adding fake nodes [16] could also minimize
the classification accuracy of GCN. Apart from the attacks on
GCN, some unsupervised embedding methods are also concerned,
e.g., Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) based attack [17] was
introduced to lower the accuracy of DeepWalk [18] and LINE [19]
on link prediction task. As innovative as they are, these attack
approaches are still limited to the algorithms of static networks.
3 PRELIMINARY AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we present the definition of DNLP, as well as the
adversarial attacks on it.
3.1 Dynamic Network Link Prediction
A network structure could be represented by G = {V,E}, where
V = {v1, v2, · · · , vn} denotes the set of network nodes, and
E ⊆ V ×V represents the set of links. A directed link from vi
pointing to vj is denoted by an ordered pair of nodes (vi, vj). In
this paper, we focus on the dynamic networks with fixed node set
but temporal links. Such a dynamic network could be modeled as a
sequence of graphs {Gt−N , · · · , Gt−1}, where Gk = {V,Ek}
represents the network’s structure at the kth interval. With this,
the definition of DNLP goes as follows.
Definition 3.1. DNLP. Given a sequence of N graphs S = {At−N ,
· · · , At−1}, where Ak denotes the adjacent matrix of Gk, the
task of dynamic network link prediction is to learn a mapping
S→ At, that is, a mapping from historical snapshots to future
network structure.
Specifically, DNLP algorithms capture latent spatial features
and temporal patterns from historical information, i.e. previous N
adjacency matrices, and then are able to infer the adjacency matrix
of next snapshot. A link exists between vi and vj at time t if the
probability P (At(i, j)) given by the DNLP algorithm is larger
than some threshold.
3.2 Adversarial Attack on DNLP
The idea of the adversarial attack has been extensively explored in
computer vision, which is typically achieved by adding unnotice-
able perturbation to images in order to mislead classifiers. Sim-
ilarly, adversarial network attack on DNLP generates adversarial
examples by adding or deleting a limited number of links from the
original network, so as to make DNLP algorithms fail to predict
target linkages. Intuitively, the goal of the generated adversarial
example is to minimize the probability of the target link predicted
by the DNLP algorithms, which could be formalized as
minP (At(i, j)|Sˆ)
where Sˆ = S+4S (1)
Sˆ denotes the designed adversarial example. 4S is the perturba-
tion introduced into S, specifically, the amount of links that need
modification.
Different from the attack strategies on static network algo-
rithms, the chosen links added to or deleted from historical
snapshots are associated with temporal information. One same link
on different snapshots may contribute differently in the prediction
of target link, not to mention that the linkages are time-varying.
Therefore, it is crucial to take time into consideration when
designing the attacks.
4 TIME-AWARE GRADIENT ATTACK
In order to generate adversarial dynamic network with optimal link
modification scheme, a naive idea is to search through permutation
and combination, which however is extremely time-consuming.
Fortunately, deep learning based DNLP methods produce abun-
dant information when making predictions, i.e., the gradients,
which may assist adversarial example generation. Here, we first
briefly introduce DDNE and then show how it can help to generate
adversarial examples. The framework is shown in Figure 1. It
should be noted that it doesn’t matter which DNLP model is
adopted here, as long as it can achieve a reasonable performance.
4.1 The Framework of DDNE
DDNE has a dual encoder-decoder structure. A GRU could be
used as the encoder, which reads the input node sequence both
forward and backward, and turns the node into lower representa-
tion. The decoder, which consists of several fully connected layers,
restores the input node from the extracted features. For a node vi,
the encoding process is described as
−→
h ki = GRU(
−→
h k−1i +
−→
S k(i :, )),
←−
h ki = GRU(
←−
h k−1i +
←−
S k(i :, )),
hki = [
−→
h ki ,
←−
h ki ], k = {t−N, · · · , t− 1},
ci = [h
t−N
i , · · · ,ht−1i ],
(2)
where hki represents the hidden state of the GRU when pro-
cessing vi of the kth snapshot, and ci is the concatenation of
all hki in time order. h
k
i consits of two parts, the forward one−→
h ki and the reversed one
←−
h ki , which are fed with opposite
time sequence,
−→
S (i, :)) = {At−N(i, :), · · · ,At−1(i, :)} and←−
S (i :, )) = {At−1(i, :), · · · ,At−N(i, :)}, respectively. The
decoder is composed of multilayer perceptrons, of which the
complexity may vary according to the scale of datasets. The
decoding process could be fomulated as
y
(1)
i = σ1(W
(1)ci + b
(1)),
y
(m)
i = σm(W
(m−1)y(m−1)i + b
(m)),m = 2, · · · ,M
(3)
where M represents the number of layers in the decoder, and σm
denotes the activation function applied in the mth decoder layer.
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Fig. 1. The framework of TGA-based methods. The nodes in the trees below represent the generation of adversarial examples and each one in
orange corresponds to the example generated in the current iteration.
Here, σm = ReLU(·) when m < M and σM = sigmoid(·).
In the training process, DDNE minimizes objective function Lall
which consists of three parts: an adjusted L2 loss Ls between
predicted snapshot and the true one to learn the transition pattern,
an adjusted L2 loss Lc between the two embeddings to capture
interaction proximity and a regularization term Lreg to avoid
overfitting. And Lall is defined as
Lall = Ls + βLc + γLreg. (4)
Here, Ls adds an additional weight Z(i, :) to L2 loss in order to
ease the impact of sparsity, with {Z(i, j)}nj=1 = 1 if St(i, j) = 0
and {Z(i, j)}nj=1 = α > 1 otherwise. Ls is defined as
Ls = −
n∑
i=1
Z(i, :) [At(i, :)− Aˆt(i, :)]2
= −
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Z(i, j)[At(i, j)− Aˆt(i, j)]2.
(5)
On the other hand, Lc imposes Nij , the amount of links between
vi and vj in historical snapshots, to L2 loss. It addresses the
influence of historical connections, and is defined as
Lc =
n∑
u,v=1
Nij ‖ ci − cj ‖2. (6)
4.2 Time-aware Link Gradient
When training DDNE, we calculate ∂Lall/∂W to update the
corresponding weights W through stochastic gradient descent.
Similarly, in adversarial network generation, we can update S(i, :)
by taking ∂Lall/∂S(i, :) with S(i, :) being the variable. Lall
integrates the information of the entire network, which makes
the links that contribute the most in prediction covered among
all links in S(i, :). To find out the most valuable links in target
link prediction, we design Lt to only take the target link into
consideration. Its definition goes as follows.
Lt = −[1− Aˆt(i, j)]2, (7)
with Aˆt(i, j) equal to P (At(i, j)), the probability gener-
ated by DDNE. This can make the time-aware link gradient,
∂Lt/∂S(i, :), more concentrated when it is applied in target
link attack. The calculation of ∂Lt/∂S(i, :) follows the chain
rule and the partial derivative can be obtained by calculating
∂f(S(i, :))(i, j)/∂S(i, :) with DDNE regarded as f , which is
described as
∂Lt
∂S(i, :)
= 2[1− Aˆt(i, j)]∂Aˆt(i, j)
∂S(i, :)
= 2[1− Aˆt(i, j)]∂f(S(i, :))(i, j)
∂S(i, :)
.
(8)
Note that ∂Lt/∂S(i, :) is a tensor with the same shape of S(i, :),
and the element gk(i, j) represents the gradient of linkage (i, j)
on the kth snapshot.
4.3 Traversal Search Based TGA
Based on the gradients ∂Lt/∂S(i, :), we can find the links
to be modified, so as to realize the attack. The modification
involves both the magnitude and sign of gt(i, j), which decides the
candidate linkages and how they should be modified, respectively.
To lower the modification cost, we focus on the linkages with
maximum magnitude since the changes of such linkages have
greater impact on Lt than the others. The sign of gradients,
denoted as sign(gk(i, j)), determines whether to add or remove
links. Specifically, if there is a link between vi and vj at the
kth snapshot with sign(gk(i, j)) = 1, it means this link has
positive effect on the prediction of the target link, and thus can
be removed to lower the prediction performance; In the reverse
case, suppose vi and vj are not connected at the kth snapshot but
with sign(gk(i, j)) = −1, we then can add a link between vi and
vj on the corresponding snapshot to realize the attack. Therefore,
the modification can be simply defined as
Aˆk(i, j) = Ak(i, j) + sign(gk(i, j)). (9)
It should be noted that such a modification should be ignored
when Ak(i, j) = 1 and sign(gk(i, j)) = 1 (or Ak(i, j) = 0
and sign(gk(i, j)) = −1). That is, we don’t encourage multiple
connections between a pair of nodes, neither can we remove a
non-existing link.
4.3.1 Search across Snapshots
Within one iteration, we first sort links based on |gij | with respect
to each snapshot, and then select the qualified links with maximum
|gij | in each snapshot. We modify these candidate links based
on Eq. (9). The operations are based on the hypothesis that the
links on different snapshots weigh differently in prediction. When
implementing the above steps, we treat the one-link modification
on the target snapshot as a basic operation, called OneStepAttack,
as shown in Algorithm 1.
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Fig. 2. Illusatration of TGA-Tra and TGA-Gre with ns = 2 and γ = 8. The doted boxes in red represent the final adversarial examples. By
comparison, TGA-Tra needs to compare a larger number of candidates, leading to higher time complexity.
Algorithm 1: OneStepAttack
Input: Original network S(i, :), the partial derivative
∂Lt/∂S(i, :), target snapshot k;
Output: Adversarial network S(i, :)
Initialize S(i, :) = S(i, :);
Sort {Ak(i, 0), · · · , Ak(i, n)} by the magnitudes of their
gradient in descending order.;
for j = 0 to |V | do
if Ak(i, j) is qualified then
Modify S(i, :) according to Eq. (9);
return S(i, :);
end
4.3.2 Search between Iterations
We iteratively add perturbations to S(i, :) when performing the
attack. In each iteration, the perturbation 4S is designed accord-
ing to the time-aware link gradients. We have two options for
this, one is to use the gradients obtained in the last iteration (for
higher efficiency), and the other is to re-calculate them based
on the adversarial example generated in the last iteration (for
higher effectiveness). Here, we use the second one. We first obtain
all possible adversarial examples in γ iterations. After that, we
choose the one which could achieve the minimum pij as the final
adversarial example. The procedure of our TGA-Tra is visualized
in the left part of Figure 2. For instance, when we set the number of
historical snapshots ns = 2 and γ = 8, we will have 28 = 1024
possible adversarial examples as candidates, and the red doted
box in Iteration 8 is the finally chosen one. Clearly we can get
the attack route through backtracking. The details of TGA-Tra are
presented in Algorithm 2.
4.4 Greedy Search Based TGA
TGA-Tra could be effective since it compares a large number of
modification schemes, but it is of relatively high time complexity,
especially for large N and ns. Taking the partial derivatives of
the input pairs of nodes (op1) and sorting them in descending or-
der (op2) are the two most time-consuming steps when performing
the attack. For TGA-Tra, we need to repeat the above two steps at
most 2γ−1ns times to hide the target link from being predicted,
Algorithm 2: TGA-Tra: Attack via traversal search
Input: A trained DDNE, original network S(i, :),
maximum number of modifications γ;
Output: adversarial example: Sˆ(i, :)
Initialize Sˆ0(i, :) = S(i, :);
while γ > 0 do
Calculate the partial derivative with respect to all
Sˆ(i, j) obtained in last iteration
for k = 1 to ns do
Obtain Sˆ(i, j) by perform OneStepAttack on the
kth snapshot
p(i,j) = DDNE(Sˆ(i, j))
end
Select Sˆ(i, :) with minimum p(i,j);
γ = γ − 1;
end
Sˆ(i, :) = Sˆγ(i, :);
return Sˆ(i, :);
which is barely affordable in real cases. We thus propose another
greedy search method, namely TGA-Gre, as shown in the right
part of Figure 2. Here, in each iteration, we select the one
achieving the minimum pij as the most effective adversarial
example, which is further considered as the input of next iteration.
The details of TGA-Gre are presented in Algorithm 3.
For a target link (i, j), TGA-Gre assumes that the lowest pij
in each iteration could lead to the best attack result. It avoids
massive comparisons between iterations and thus can significantly
accelerate the whole process. Similar to the procedure of TGA-
Tra, TGA-Gre also compares gt across all snapshots during each
iteration. The major difference is that TGA-Gre elects a local
optimal link in each iteration. It is clear that we only need to repeat
op1 and op2 at most 2γns times, which is much more efficient.
5 EXPERIMENTS
5.1 Datasets
We perform experiments on three real-world dynamic networks,
with their basic statistics listed in Table 1.
5Algorithm 3: TGA-Gre: Attack via greedy search
Input: A trained DDNE, original network S(i, :),
maximum number of modifications γ;
Output: adversarial example: Sˆ(i, :)
Initialize Sˆ0(i, :) = S(i, :)
while γ > 0 do
for k = 1 to ns do
g = ∂Lt/∂Sˆk−1(i, j)
Sˆtemp(i, :)=OneStepAttack(Sˆk−1(i, :), g, k)
ptemp(i, j) = DDNE(Sˆtemp(i, :))
end
Select Sˆk(i, :) with minimum p(i,j)
γ = γ − 1
end
Sˆ(i, :) = Sˆγ(i, :);
return Sˆ(i, :)
TABLE 1
The basic statistics of the three datasets
Dataset |V | |ET | d¯ dmax Timespan(days)
RADOSLAW 151 72.2K 27.7 240 242
LKML 2,210 201.7K 7.9 718 731
FB-WOSN 2,635 46.7K 2.2 48 731
• RADOSLAW [20]: It is an internal e-mail network between
employees in a mid-sized manufacturing company. We
focus on the nodes appeared in 2010-01 and construct
network using their interactions from 2010-02-01 to 2010-
09-30.
• LKML [21]: It is also an email network from the linux
kernel mailing list. We focus on the users who appeared
on the mailing list between 2007-01-01 and 2007-04-01
and slice the data during the next 12 months at an interval
of 3 months.
• FB-WOSN [22]: It contains a small subset of posts to
other users’ walls on Facebook. We construct the dynamic
network based on the data recorded between 2007-01-01
and 2009-01-01, and divide the data into 4 snapshots with
an interval of 6 months. Each node represents a user that
has made a post between 2006-07-01 and 2007-01-01.
5.2 Baseline Methods
As the first work to study adversarial attack on DNLP algorithms,
we design three baseline attacks as follows, to compare with TGA-
Gre and TGA-Tra.
• Random Attack (RA): RA randomly modifies γ linkages
in all snapshots. In practice, we add b new connections
to the target node and remove γ − b links between the
target node and its neighbors. Here, we use RA to see the
robustness of DNLP algorithms under random noises.
• Common-Neighbor-based Attack (CNA): CNA adds b
links between node pairs with less common neighbors and
remove γ − b links between those with more common
neighbors. We adopt CNA as a baseline since common
neighbor is the basis of many similarity metrics between
pairwise nodes used for link prediction.
• Direct Gradient-based Attack (DGA): DGA recursively
modify the linkage with maximum absolute gradient ob-
tained by ∂Lt/∂S(i, :), until the attack succeeds, or the
number of modifications reaches γ. We use DGA as a
baseline to address the importance of utilizing temporal
information in attacking DNLP algorithms.
We set γ = 8 in all experiments and b = 4 for RA and CNA.
In TGA and DGA, we do not limit the proportion of added and
removed links. We first train the models with original data, and
then feed adversarial examples generated by DDNE to each model,
to validate the effectiveness of the attacks.
5.3 Evaluation Metrics
We choose attack success rate (ASR) and average attack modifi-
cation links (AML) as attack effectiveness criterion.
• ASR: The ratio of the amount of links that are successfully
hidden to the total number of target links that can be
correctly predicted in the target snapshot.
• AML: The average amount of perturbation to prevent each
target link from being predicted. If it needs to modify at
least qi links to hide link i, then AML is defined as
AML = 1
m
m−1∑
i=0
qi, (10)
where m represents the number of target links. Note that
qi ≤ γ and the equality holds when the attack fails.
5.4 Results
Firstly, we use the generated adversarial examples to fool the
DDNE model to prevent target links from being predicted. We set
γ = 10 to ensure the disguise of modification, which also leads
the maximum of AML equal to 10. The results are presented
in Table 2. The two TGA methods outperform DGA in terms
of both ASR and AML, while DGA is better than CNA
and RA. The results suggest that: 1) the gradients of DDNE is
critical to attack different DNLP methods; 2) utilizing temporal
information can indeed significantly improve the attack effect.
Moreover, we can see that the adversarial examples generated
by DDNE can also be used to attack other DNLP algorithms,
such as ctRBM, GTRBM and dynAERNN. Although the attack
performance may be relatively inferior in these algorithms, the
two TGA methods still behave better than the three baselines,
indicating their transferability.
As expected, TGA-Tra behaves better than TGA-Gre, but the
latter is much more efficient and thus more practical in real-
world applications. Almost all the methods behave much better
on FB-WOSN than the other two networks, indicating that sparser
networks are relatively easier to be disturbed by adversarial
attacks, that is, the DNLP algorithms on sparser networks are less
robust. The significant gap of the performance between TGA-Tra
and TGA-Gre overturns the hypothesis that the greatest drop of
Lt in each iteration does not lead to the best attack performance
sometimes. This enlightens us to further explore specific meanings
behind gt. We find that the performance of TGA-Tra and TGA-
Gre are very similar in each iteration, but their routes seem totally
different. By investigating these adversarial examples, we have the
following two observations:
6TABLE 2
Attack performance in terms of ASR and AML (the best two are marked in bold)
Dataset
DNLP
method
ASR(%) (higher is better) AML (lower is better)
RA DGA CNA TGA-Gre TGA-Tra RA DGA CNA TGA-Gre TGA-Tra
RADOSLAW
DDNE 3.46 24.09 18.65 25.79 26.04 7.72 7.23 7.56 7.17 7.16
ctRBM 1.32 14.10 5.08 15.19 19.23 7.79 7.76 7.56 7.49 7.32
GTRBM 1.08 12.58 5.31 14.10 18.88 7.93 7.48 7.83 7.45 7.39
dynAERNN 1.72 11.24 4.38 11.38 18.14 7.86 7.51 7.72 7.50 7.20
LKML
DDNE 20.19 63.79 48.91 65.52 83.71 6.39 4.84 5.92 4.74 3.73
ctRBM 2.03 15.29 9.31 20.59 24.31 7.91 6.71 7.30 6.14 5.83
GTRBM 1.17 5.74 3.29 10.02 17.99 7.92 7.49 7.73 7.14 6.36
dynAERNN 0.33 2.11 1.02 2.52 2.94 7.97 7.89 7.92 7.88 7.86
FB-WOSN
DDNE 60.03 95.45 84.31 99.53 99.53 3.20 2.36 2.76 2.08 2.07
ctRBM 19.45 40.42 29.51 49.36 59.19 5.72 4.87 5.25 4.32 3.98
GTRBM 24.15 42.06 38.29 55.39 64.39 6.02 5.23 5.81 4.98 4.75
dynAERNN 18.51 35.90 39.19 40.00 60.60 6.52 5.90 5.85 6.00 4.55
• First, TGA-Tra is more likely to modify the links on earlier
historical snapshots, while TGA-Gre tends to change the
links on the most recent ones;
• Second, TGA-Tra prefers to add rather than delete links,
while TGA-Gre has the opposite tendency.
Such observations indicate that TGA-Tra could be more concealed
than TGA-Gre, since people tend to pay more attention to recent
events, e.g., link change in recent snapshots. On the other hand,
TGA-Gre may be preferred if we want to get some short-term
attack effect. Besides, TGA-Tra seems to have lower social cost,
since adding links are always easier than deleting in our social
circle.
5.4.1 Attack on Long-term Prediction
Besides focusing on the next immediate snapshot, researchers al-
ways look into the performance of DNLP algorithms on long-term
prediction. Similarly, we would also like to investigate whether
the two TGA methods are effective for hiding remote future links.
We first make predictions for the 3th, 4th, 5th and 6th snapshot
with ns = 2 and then compare the attack performance on different
snapshots, as shown in Figure 3. We can see that, generally, the
performance of both TGA-Tra and TGA-Gre improve as we attack
longer-term prediction, indicating that longer-term prediction is
easier to be disturbed and thus is overall less robust against
adversarial attacks.
5.4.2 Long-history Attack
Typically, larger ns means more historical information can be used
in prediction, and thus may improve the performance of DNLP
algorithms. Here, we are interested in whether the increase of
ns can also help these algorithms resist adversarial attacks. We
compare the attack performance of the two TGA methods on the
three data sets with respect to different ns. In particular, we first
apply DDNE with the input sequence varying from 2 to 4, and then
generate adversarial examples. The results are shown in Figure 4,
where we can see that, indeed, the performance of both TGA-Tra
and TGA-Gre decrease significantly as ns increases, indicating
that larger ns makes DDNE more robust against adversarial
attacks.
5.4.3 Adding-link Attack
In social networks, it is considered that deleting links is of higher
social cost than adding operations. Moreover, temporal networks
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Fig. 4. The performance of TGA-Tra and TGA-Gre when ns changes
from 2 to 4 (From left to right).
may also have multiple interactions between a pair of nodes.
Therefore, deleting one link on a snapshot always removes all
the corresponding interactions in the given interval. Due to this
gap between the cost of deleting and adding links, we would
like to investigate how the attack performance of the two TGA
7TABLE 3
The performance of TGA-Tra and TGA-Gre with only adding links
Method Dataset RADOSLAW LKML FB-WOSN
TGA-Tra
ASR(%) 23.75 76.19 99.45
GAIN(%) -2.09 -6.84 -0.08
AML 7.23 4.07 2.12
GAIN 0.07 0.37 0.05
TGA-Gre
ASR(%) 21.95 64.92 99.37
GAIN(%) -3.27 -0.60 -0.16
AML 7.27 4.77 2.08
GAIN 0.10 0.03 -0.04
methods will be influenced if we just add, rather than rewire, links
to the original networks. The results are presented in Table 3,
where we find that the performance of both TGA-Tra and TGA-
Gre slightly decrease when we perform the attack only by adding
links, especially on the network FB-WOSN. Such results indicate
that, in certain cases, we can perform the cheap attack on DNLP
by only adding a small number of links, at the cost of losing a
little bit attack performance.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present the first work of adversarial attack on
DNLP, and propose the time-aware gradient, as well as two TGA
methods, namely TGA-Tra and TGA-Gre, to realize the attack.
We use these methods to attack the advanced DNLP algorithms,
including DDNE, ctRBM, GTRBM and dynAERNN, on three
real-world dynamic networks, and the results show that our TGA
methods behave better than the other baselines, achieving the
state-of-the-art attack performance. The fact that the adversarial
examples generated by TGA on DDNE can also be used to effec-
tively attack other DNLP algorithms validates the trasferability of
TGA methods. Interestingly, we also find that long-term prediction
seems to be more vulnerable to adversarial attacks, while using
longer historical information can enhance the robustness of DNLP
algorithms.
In the future, we will apply TGA methods to attack more
DNLP algorithms, and further propose better strategies to improve
their attack performance; on the other hand, we will also seek
for methods to defend against such adversarial attacks, to achieve
more robust DNLP algorithms.
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